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A mobile coupon (m-coupon) can be presented with a smartphone for obtaining a financial discount when purchasing a product
or a service. M-coupons are a powerful marketing tool that has enjoyed a huge growth and diffusion, involving tens of millions of
people each year. We propose an architecture which may enable significant improvements over current m-coupon technology, in
terms of acceptance of potential customers and of marketing actions that become feasible: the customer does not need to install
any dedicated app; an m-coupon is not bound to any specific device or customer; an m-coupon may be redeemed at any store in a
set of potentially many thousands of stores, without any prior arrangement between customer and store. We are not aware of any
proposal with these properties.
1. Introduction
A mobile coupon (m-coupon) is a piece of data constructed
and delivered electronically that can be used for a financial
discount when purchasing a product or a service [1]. M-
coupons are used for a variety of marketing purposes, usually
in sales promotion as well as for attracting customers to
services and entertainment [2]. M-coupons have enjoyed a
huge growth and diffusion: it has been estimated that more
than 97 million people redeemed a mobile coupon in the US
in 2015, corresponding to an 18% growth over the previous
year [3]. Tens of millions of people redeemed m-coupons
by presenting them on the screen on their smartphones or
tablets.
Froma technological point of view,m-coupon implemen-
tations must address several security-related issues. When a
customer presents an m-coupon to a merchant for redemp-
tion, the merchant must be able to ascertain that the m-
coupon (a) is authentic, (b) has not beenmodified in any part,
(c) has not been redeemed already, and (d) has not expired
(m-coupons usually have an expiration date). Ensuring these
properties is essential to the merchant and, more broadly, to
all the actors involved in the marketing action [4].
All the m-coupon implementations that we are aware of
are based on one or more of the following constraints: a
given m-coupon may be redeemed only by a specific device
or a specific customer; a given m-coupon may be redeemed
only at a specific store, or at any store in a predefined small
set of stores. These requirements are usually fulfilled by
forcing customers to handle m-coupons through dedicated
software to be installed on their smartphones or tablets [4–
6]. Furthermore, customers must often exhibit a validation
code or password to the store when redeeming them-coupon
[7, 8].
A key reason for the ubiquitous presence of those con-
straints is because they allow ensuring the necessary security
properties efficiently. For example, an m-coupon inextricably
coupled to a certain device cannot be redeemed at multiple
locations simultaneously. Similarly, redemption of an m-
coupon linked to a small set of stores may be made known
at all those stores very quickly.
In this work, we propose the design of an architecture for
m-coupons that is not affected by the above constraints. In
our proposal, anm-couponmay be redeemedby any device of
any customer and anm-couponmay be redeemed at any store
involved in the promotion, without any prior arrangement.
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The set of such stores may be geographically dispersed and
very large, that is, even in the order of many thousands.
Most importantly, customers are not required to install any
dedicated app on their devices: m-coupons aremerely images
that can be accessed with any software freely and that may be
exhibited to merchants in any form, typically on the screen of
a smartphone and also in print.We are not aware of any other
proposal with these features.
The resulting scenario has several highly desirable prop-
erties. First and foremost, the fact that customers do not
need to install any app makes the customer experience easier
and removes a crucial constraint that is associated with
significant security and privacy-related risks. Indeed, those
factors play a crucial role in the willingness of potential
customers to participate in marketing actions based on m-
coupons [9–11]. Furthermore, the ability to accessm-coupons
from multiple personal devices freely has nowadays become
a practical necessity; for example, one could obtain an m-
coupon by email while browsing with a tablet at home
and then redeem the m-coupon while travelling with only
the smartphone available. The ability to move m-coupons
across devices of different owners has become essential as
well: families typically have tens of devices, and parents
must be able to transfer their m-coupons to kids easily.
Removing the need of checking the identity of customers,
or their knowledge of a certain code, also enables much
faster and frictionless processing of m-coupon redemption
within stores. The ability to redeem an m-coupon anywhere
without any prior arrangement with the store also contributes
tomaking the customer experience easier: for example, anm-
coupon for a cinema chain may be constructed and delivered
without forcing the customer to declare in advance at which
specific cinema he/she is going to redeem the m-coupon.The
simplicity of the overall scenario may encourage potential
customers to use m-coupons even when their financial value
is small, whichmay enable a range ofmarketing actionswhich
do not fit current m-coupon technology well [12–14].
The difficulty in supporting anonymous m-coupons on a
large network of stores may be realized easily, as it suffices to
consider this key security threat:
(1) A customer obtains a valid m-coupon.
(2) The customer constructs many identical copies of the
m-coupon and sends each copy to a set of colluding
customers.
(3) All colluding customers present themselves at differ-
ent stores, at exactly the same time; each store will
thus see a customer that exhibits a valid m-coupon.
Note that step (2) may be executed in a matter of seconds
and may potentially involve thousands of geographically
dispersed colluding customers.
1.1. Related Work. Several m-coupon solutions have been
proposed in different forms: patented frameworks, com-
mercial platforms, or research models. To the best of our
knowledge, none of them exhibits the properties stated in
the previous section.The architecture outlined in [8] requires
the customer to have a dedicated application installed on
his/her smartphone, while the one in [15] binds each m-
coupon to a specified customer device. The commercial
platform described in [7] may be deployed in a variety of
ways. Validation of an m-coupon may be done either on a
dedicated application installed on the customer device or
on a different dedicated application installed on a device in
control of the store. In the latter case, the customer has to
provide a password to be manually inserted in the device.
The password must be made known to the store in advance
and is bound to a single store/m-coupon pair. Fulfilling this
requirement in a large network of geographically distributed
stores is clearly difficult. A centralized service has to be
contacted in order to prevent single spending. Depending
on the specific deployment options, the centralized service
is also the only entity able to check authenticity, integrity,
and temporal validity. Similar remarks apply to platform
[5]. Platform [6] is designed for retailers composed of a
small number of shops and stores m-coupons in a dedicated
application on the customer device.
Models and protocols for generating and distributing
digital coupons with strong security properties are proposed
in [4].The analysis is not focused on the technological aspects
and the proposed implementation assumes that the customer
is equipped with a dedicated application.
A similar remark applies to more recent proposals in
[16, 17], which assume that the customer is equipped with a
dedicated application able to implement a certain communi-
cation protocol.
Finally, we mention that the ability of our architecture
to validate authenticity of an m-coupon locally (i.e., without
contacting a centralized store) even when the m-coupon
is not bound to the location of the validating entity may
be useful in other application domains. For example, it has
been recently shown that exclusive airline lounges in several
airports allow access by presenting a simple QR code that can
be faked easily [18].
2. Our Approach
2.1. ProblemDefinition. Anm-coupon is a piece of data that is
constructed by an issuer and may be redeemed by a customer
at a store in exchange for an item or a service. The customer
does not need to install any dedicated app and exhibits an m-
coupon either in print or on the screen of a smartphone.
An m-coupon has a predefined expiration date and is not
bound to any specific customer or store. We target a design
region consisting of potentially thousands of stores, where
thousands of m-coupons may be redeemed at each store each
day. Transmission of m-coupons from issuer to customers
is orthogonal to this work, as well as all the business and
operational agreements between issuer and stores.
Our proposed approach ensures the following security
properties for m-coupons: (a) authenticity (an m-coupon
can only be constructed by the issuer), (b) integrity (any
modification to an m-coupon is detected upon redeeming),
(c) single spendability (an m-coupon cannot be redeemed
more than once), and (d) temporal validity (an m-coupon
cannot be redeemed after its predefined expiration date).
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In this section, we assume that attacks on these security
properties may only come from customers: we assume that
stores and technical infrastructure are trusted and we shall
relax these assumptions in a later section. Concerning attacks
on the single-spendability property, in particular, we consider
the worst possible threat model: many redeeming attempts
of the same m-coupon may occur simultaneously at many
different, geographically dispersed stores.Of course, themore
pessimistic the threat model, the more potentially complex
and costly the solution.
We emphasize our assumption that customers do not
need to install any dedicated app on their smartphones or
tablets. While assuming that customers exhibit m-coupons
through a dedicated trusted app would simplify the imple-
mentation, we believe that considering customer-provided
data as untrusted leads to a stronger solution:
(1) The app might be reverse-engineered and/or its secu-
rity properties might be circumvented.
(2) It would be very difficult for a clerk to make sure that
the app shown by a customer is indeed the legitimate
app.
Furthermore, forcing customers to install an app on their
smartphones or tablets would prevent the redemption of
printed coupons and may hinder wide acceptance of the
solution; such a requirement is intrusive and constitutes a
strong privacy risk.
2.2. Usage Scenario. In our approach, an m-coupon consists
of two components: a QR code and a description of the
item associated with the m-coupon. The clerk at the store
is equipped with a dedicated validation app running on
a smartphone. The validation app may be distributed and
updated through the standard app store mechanisms (i.e.,
Google Play, iTunes, and Windows Store). The smartphone
needs an Internet connection.
The clerk scans the QR code in the m-coupon exhibited
by the customer and the validation app quickly shows one of
the following outcomes:
(1) An indication that the m-coupon may be redeemed,
along with a short textual description of the asso-
ciated item. This description may include a univer-
sal product identifier (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Global Trade Item Number) to simplify integration
with store and register working.
(2) An indication that the m-coupon cannot be re-
deemed, along with a textual description of the
reason, which may be one of the following:
(a) The m-coupon is not authentic or has been
altered or has expired.
(b) The m-coupon has been redeemed already.
(c) The m-coupon cannot be redeemed in this
moment for technical reasons.
The full operation will take a few seconds, similar to a
credit/debit card payment (see also the next section). Note
that stores do not need to ask for any proof of identity of
customers.
Clerks must be instructed to do the following:
(1) Never scan QR codes with a customer-provided
device. They must use only a store-provided smart-
phone (or their personal smartphone, if allowed to do
so by the store owner).
(2) Trust only the textual description coming from the
app after scanning the QR code.The item description
presented by the customer in an m-coupon is not to
be trusted.
The app verifies authenticity, integrity, and temporal validity
of the coupon locally.The app verifies that the coupon has not
been redeemed already by contacting via HTTPS a centralized
service.
2.3. Implementation. Key feature of our approach is that the
QR code embeds a cryptographic signature of the issuer. It
follows that m-coupons cannot be forged or modified. The
validation app ensures authenticity, integrity, and tempo-
ral validity locally, by simply verifying the validity of the
signature. Contemporary technology makes this approach
practically feasible, even with low-end smartphones (see
Discussion). The validation app cannot ensure the single-
spendability property locally: it contacts a centralized service
which serializes m-coupon redemptions for preventing coor-
dinated attacks aimed at multiple redemptions of the same
m-coupon at different stores.
2.3.1. QR Code and App. The QR code is a piece of data
cryptographically signed by the issuer. In detail, the QR code
encodes a sequence of data that we denote as <D,S>; D
consists of the following:
(i) D-code: a pseudorandom code that uniquely iden-
tifies each coupon and is sufficiently long to not be
guessed (e.g., 20 characters)
(ii) D-text: a short textual description of the item associ-
atedwith the coupon, optionally including a universal
product code
(iii) D-expire: expiration date of the coupon
while S is the corresponding signature of D (full details in the
next section).
The validation app executes the following operations:
(1) Scan the QR code, extracting <D,S>.
(2) Verify authenticity, integrity, and temporal validity of
the coupon. This operation is done locally.
(i) Authenticity and integrity are verified by simply
verifying that S is indeed a valid signature for D.
To this end, the app must have a certificate with
the public key of the signer. This certificate may
be distributed with the app.
(ii) Temporal validity may be verified by simply
comparing D-expire to the current date.
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Figure 1: Centralized service architecture.
(3) In case of failed verification, terminate with outcome
(2)-(a) in the previous section; otherwise, do the
following.
(4) Send D-code to a central location and receive either
(i) “ok” corresponding to outcome (1) in the previ-
ous section,
(ii) “not-ok” corresponding to outcome (2)-(b).
All these operations are typically executed in a few sec-
onds (in particular, the cryptographic steps involved in the
digital signature verification and HTTPS interaction with a
centralized server may be expected to take much less than
one second based on the data in [19, 20]). These operations
can be easily integrated with the usual store and register
working. Communication exceptions are presented by the
app as outcome (2)-(c) in the previous section.
Note that the QR code is not used as a URL-encoding
mechanism: the validation app always connects to the same
service whose address is hardwired within the app itself.
It follows that phishing or pharming attacks in which a
customer drives the validation app on a fake web site under
the control of the customer are impossible [21].
The app may support a working mode in which the
centralized service may only be queried without redeeming
the coupon. This working mode will be used only in special
cases, that is, for ascertaining the outcome of a transaction
which experienced a communication failure, or for answering
occasional questions by customers that are unsure whether a
coupon is still valid or has been redeemed already.
2.3.2. Centralized Service. The centralized service is com-
posed of two main components (Figure 1): a redemption
service, to be accessed by each retailer in order to record
redemption of eachm-coupon and prevent multiple redemp-
tions of the same m-coupon, and a clearinghouse, which
associates each redeemed coupon with the corresponding
retailer service. We emphasize that the design has been
carefully structured to accommodate the different latency and
throughput requirements of the two components:
(i) The redemption service executes only one single-row
atomic transaction for each m-coupon redemption.
This allows using highly scalable NoSQL databases.
These complex multirow/multitable transactions are
not required at coupon redemption time.
(ii) The clearinghouse typically requires multirow/multi-
table transactions but these transactions are not exe-
cuted synchronously as part of coupon redemption by
the customer.Thus, this componentmay rely onmore
traditional database technologies without any critical
requirement in terms of latency and throughput.
Journal of Computer Networks and Communications 5
CheckAndUpdate (D-code):
RetVal fl not-ok;
Begin Atomic Transaction
row fl row of CouponCodeStatusTable such that row.CouponCode = D-code;
if (row <> null AND row.RedeemedStatus == false)
then
row.RedeemedStatus fl true;
row.RedeemedBy fl storeId;
row.RedeemedWhen fl now;
RetVal fl ok
End Atomic Transaction
return RetVal
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for request processing at the centralized service. The storeId value is an attribute of the authenticated HTTPS
session.
The main data structure at the redemption service is the
following:
(i) CouponCodeStatusTable: a table with one element for
each coupon that has not been redeemed and is not
yet expired. Each element is a tuple:
(a) CouponCode: the D-code encoded by the QR
code
(b) RedeemedStatus: a Boolean
(c) RedeemedBy: unique identifier of the app ins-
tance which redeemed the coupon
(d) RedeemedWhen: date of redemption
Redeemed and expired m-coupons are removed peri-
odically at times of light load (e.g., each night). M-
coupons just created are inserted into the table by the
same mechanism.
The CouponCodeStatusTable is accessed for the pro-
cessing of requests from the app, that is, during customer
transactions at the store. Thus, access to this table must
be very efficient. This table is implemented with a NoSQL
database supporting atomic read-write update at the level of
a single row [22]: a row will switch from RedeemedStatus =
false to RedeemedStatus = true (along with the correspond-
ing values for RedeemedBy and RedeemedWhen) only if
RedeemedStatus is false.
Complex multirow/multitable atomic transactions may
be avoided because the QR code is cryptographically signed:
authenticity, integrity, and temporal validity are guaranteed
by the cryptographic signature on the QR code, and thus
transactional access is required only for preventing multi-
ple redemptions of the same m-coupon. Furthermore, the
database engine will always be able to execute at maximal
throughput because concurrent access to the same row is
absent—multiple access to the same row may occur only
when the samem-coupon is scanned at different places at the
same time.
The clearinghouse component will maintain auxiliary
data structures for keeping track of stores, emitted m-
coupons, credentials, and so on.These data structures are not
accessed during customer transactions, and thus efficiency of
access is not critical and a broad range of technologies may
be used. We omit those data for ease of presentation.
A back-end process will run each night for moving
coupon information from the redemption service to the
clearinghouse. Value of the RedeemedBy field in theCoupon-
CodeStatusTable will be used, perhaps through further inter-
mediate tables, for performing the necessary join operations.
2.3.3. Communication. Communication between app and
centralized service occurs on an HTTPS channel, with only
one application-level message round. A request from the app
consists of a pair <D-code, operation> where operation may
be either CheckAndUpdate or Check. The corresponding
response may be either “ok” or “not-ok” as described above.
The processing of each request is described in Algorithm 1.
In terms of the lightweight transactions supported in
Cassandra (a highly scalable NoSQL database; see also the
next section), the single-row atomic transaction may be
expressed as [22]
UPDATE CouponCodeStatusTable SET
RedeemedStatus = true,
RedeemedBy = storeId, RedeemedWhen = now
WHERE CouponCode = D-code
IF RedeemedStatus = true;
The Check operation may be executed without any transac-
tion (we omit its description for simplicity). We emphasize
that single-row atomic transactions of this form are not
a peculiarity of Cassandra as they are supported in other
NoSQLdatabases such as, for example,MongoDBandHBase.
Each app must authenticate itself to the centralized ser-
vice. Lifecycle management of credentials is to be performed
by the issuer. In order to not perform authentication upon
each connection, the standard practice of mobile application
development may be used, in which credentials are inserted
in the app upon first use and then the app is implicitly
authenticated indefinitely (or until revocation from either
side). The software technology is the “implicit grant” in the
OAuth2 framework [23].
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3. Discussion
3.1. QR Code. QR codes are routinely used for ticket ver-
ification by airlines and public transport companies (e.g.,
[24]). This fact demonstrates that scanning a QR code in an
“unfavorable” environment is indeed feasible and practical.
In those scenarios, though, authenticity, integrity, and
single spendability may be guaranteed easily: a QR code
may contain just a short code to be checked against a
database locally available to the scanning device (although
there are many real systems which fail to implement these
steps correctly [18]). In the scenario of our interest, this
approach is not feasible because m-coupons are not bound
to any specific location. Thus, it would be necessary to
distribute a description of all newly emitted m-coupons
to many thousands of geographically dispersed databases;
and, most importantly, each redemption would have to be
recorded instantaneously at all those databases to prevent
frauds by multiple colluding attackers presenting the same
QR code at different geographical locations.
To demonstrate that a QR codemay easily store the larger
amount of information required in our scenario, consider
what follows. The QR code must encode a triplet <D-code,
D-text, D-expire> along with an associated signature S, as
described previously.
Signature S could be generated, for example, with RSA
signature. The length of an RSA signature is the same as the
length of the key size used for signing. A 2048-bit key size is
the current standard in most environments [25]. A signature
generated with such keys will thus require 256 alphanumeric
characters.
FieldD-expiremay be representedwith 6 characterswhile
D-code could be represented with 20 bytes. It follows that we
need a QR code capable of encoding 256 + 6 + 20 + size of
(D-text) = 282 + size of (D-text) characters.
Data capacity of a QR code depends on the “version” of
the QR code, that is, on the specific format and coding used.
A QR ode with version 14, error correction M can store 528
alphanumeric characters (http://blog.qrstuff.com/2011/12/14/
qr-code-error-correction). Error correction M is the
strongest of the two levels designed for general marketing
use. In this case, there would be 528 − 282 = 246 characters
available for D-text. Even assuming that D-text contains a
form of universal product code (https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Universal Product Code), there would be an extra 230
characters left. Information in the D-text field is thus more
than enough for enabling a clerk to reliably identify the item
associated with the mobile coupon.
Next, we need to demonstrate that those QR codes may
indeed be decoded quickly and reliably with simple devices.
To this end, consider what follows.
Generation of aQR codewith the desired “version” can be
done with a variety of tools, including online web apps (e.g.,
http://www.morovia.com/free-online-barcode-generator/
qrcode-maker.php).We generatedQRcodes of the above kind,
with a “module width” of 2mm. Tests with the camera of a
low-end smartphone (Motorola Moto G 2014 (https://en.wi-
kipedia.org/wiki/Moto G (2nd generation))) equipped with
an off-the-shelf QR code reader app (QR Code Droid
Scanner https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=la
.droid.qr&hl=en) showed quick and reliable decoding:
(i) From a screen showing the QR code in size approx.
4 cm (i.e., the web site that generates the QR code)
(ii) From a printed sheet generated with a very low-end
laser printer, provided the QR code is at least 3 cm
Tests with QR code version 15, which allows storing an
additional 80 characters (600 characters), gave identical
results.
Figure 2 contains four examples differing in the QR code
version used, which results in different amounts of characters
available for D-text (indicated in the table itself). All the
examples use 6 characters for D-expire, 20 characters for D-
code, and 256 characters for the signature. Of course, one
might choose to distribute the characters available for the D-
fields differently. We invite the reader to scan the examples,
on screen and in print.
3.2. Centralized Service. The centralized service implementa-
tion certainly requires careful engineering tomeet the desired
requirements in terms of scale, latency, and availability.
However, the service is practically feasible based on the
following considerations. Assuming a number of stores in
the order of tens of thousands (e.g., 100,000) and hundreds
of redeemed m-coupons per store per day (e.g., 500), the
service has to be able to sustain throughput in the order of
5 ⋅ 10
7 redemptions per day. Provisioning the system requires
an estimation of the maximum number of stores connected
per second. Assuming that all m-coupon redemptions are
fully concentrated in only 5 hours, one would need to sustain
100 coupons per hour per store, that is, less than 2 coupons
per minute per store. Assuming that all stores inject such a
maximum load for the 5 hours, the centralized service would
need to be able to sustain 200,000 interactions per minute,
that is, less than 3,400 per second. Below, we argue that such a
performance is easily achieved with off-the-shelf technology.
The key functionality required by the database engine
is single-row atomic transactions. A recent benchmarking
of several NoSQL databases has included this functionality
(“read-modify-write workload, YCSB type F”) [26]. The
Apache Cassandra database has been tested with up to
32 nodes and the throughput has grown linearly reaching
200,000 operations per second. The workload consisted of
50% read and 50% read-modify-write ratio: since coupon
redemption corresponds to 1 read-modify-write operation,
we may estimate that 100,000 redemptions per second may
be sustained. It is fair to claim that this figure is more than
enough for sustaining the expected load. Also, recall that
row-level conflict will be absent most of the time (except in
case of fraudulent attempts to redeem the same coupon at
the same time); hence, the optimistic concurrency control
mechanism used in Cassandra will be able to drive the engine
at maximal throughput (no locking overhead, no abort-
rollback). Latency ranged from 30ms (1 node) to 41ms (32
nodes), also in line with the requirements. There are other
reports indicating the ability of Cassandra to scale linearly
up to more than 100 nodes and 1,000,000 writes per second
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318 chars. for D-text
(600 chars. total)
246 chars. for D-text
(528 chars. total)
(a)
201 chars. for D-text
(483 total)
137 chars. for D-text
(419 total)
(b)
Figure 2: (a) Examples of QR codes encoding the required information (version 15 and version 14). (b) Examples of QR codes encoding the
required information (version 13 and version 12).
[27, 28], with one single Amazon EC2 instance able to sustain
more than 10,000 writes per second.
Concerning the HTTPS engine, a recent benchmarking
of the NGINX web (proxy) server with modern cipher suites
is summarized as follows [29]: “NGINX’s SSL performance
scales with the number of cores available on the host server,
until other limits (typically bandwidth) are met, so an 8-core
virtual machine could accept traffic from over 1,000 new users
per second and still have resources to spare.” Based on the
abovementioned benchmarks, thus, a fewNGINX boxes with
a load balancer are more than enough.
3.3. Security Properties. Authenticity, integrity, and temporal
validity are guaranteed by the cryptographic signature of
QR codes: as long as the cryptographic procedures are
implemented and deployed correctly (i.e., the signing key is
indeed private and signatures are indeed verified with the
corresponding public key), forging a QR code that will be
considered as valid by the scanning app is impossible. Single
spendability is guaranteed by the fact that all redemptions are
serialized by the centralized service.
We have assumed so far that attacks may come only from
customers which attempt to forge anm-coupon or modify an
existingm-coupon or to redeem the samem-couponmultiple
times. Below, we will consider other forms of attack. We do
not consider the case in which an attacker (either a customer
or a clerk) steals an existing valid m-coupon: this threat
cannot be avoided because m-coupons are not bound to any
owner.
3.3.1. Network Attacks. HTTPS is the standard de facto
for any Internet-based secure interaction. Correct HTTPS
deployment and usage ensure authentication of the service,
as well as integrity and secrecy of the communication
between app and centralized service. An attacker could
attempt to hijack the communication channel between app
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and centralized service, that is, by attempting to impersonate
the service and reply with “ok” either to every request or only
to selected requests.The best practices inHTTPS deployment
and app programming constitute very effective defenses in
this respect. In particular, the app must be coded so as to
connect only to the URL of the centralized service, that is,
without allowing usage of the HTTP protocol and without
allowing connecting to different URLs. Furthermore, the app
must implement certificate validation correctly, in particular,
without accepting self-signed server certificates.
3.3.2. Misuse of the Legitimate App. The validation app is
distributed through the public app stores, in order to ensure
authenticity and integrity of the code, as well as to enable
smooth and seamless distribution of app upgrades and fixes.
An attacker installing the app would not be able to
interact with the service, because he would not have the
necessary authentication credentials. An attacker using the
credentials of a store could only redeem an existing valid m-
coupon (a stolen one). In that case, the redemption would
provoke a gain for the store and the customer could not
obtain the item associated with the coupon. Thus, there is no
incentive for customers in pursuing these attacks.
3.3.3. Usage of a Fraudulent App. An attacker could imple-
ment a fraudulent app able to communicate with the service.
This attack requires reverse-engineering of the application
protocol used by the legitimate app and valid authentication
credentials. The fraudulent app may only
(1) send coupon codes generated at random;
(2) send coupon codes extracted by a signed QR code,
without performing any check on the signature.
Assuming coupon codes are implemented correctly (i.e., they
are truly random and sufficiently long to not be guessed),
point (1) is a nonissue. Of course, simple checks should
be implemented at the centralized service for detecting an
excessive number of failed attempts from a session and
reacting appropriately.
Concerning point (2), the fraudulent app may send the
coupon code extracted from
(A) a valid, possibly stolen m-coupon;
(B) an m-coupon that has expired and has not been
redeemed.
Point (A) is a nonissue (in this case, there would be no point
in implementing a fraudulent app; the legitimate app could
be used). Point (B) would not be detected by the service
while interacting with the fraudulent app, but it would be
detected later by the clearinghouse component (based on the
AllCouponsTable outlined in the Implementation). Conse-
quently, the clearinghouse component would not include the
coupon in the store account. Note that attacks of this sort
could bemeaningful only to clerks or store owners: customers
would have no reasons for implementing a fraudulent app, as
they could not obtain the item associated with the coupon.
3.4. Signing of QR Codes. Since the coupon code is sent to the
centralized service at each redemption, the additional coupon
information (item description and temporal validity) could
be sent back by the service. One may thus wonder why a
QR code contains that information, which also introduces
the need for a digital signature: a QR code containing
only a coupon code would suffice. In that case, checking
for authenticity, integrity, and temporal validity would be
all demanded to the centralized service, rather than being
delegated to the app.
There are several reasons why the QR code is crypto-
graphically signed:
(i) It prevents transmission of forged, altered, or expired
m-coupons to the service; this property eliminates
a number of possible attack vectors based on QR
codes, for example, command injections or attempts
to exploit buffer overflows at the server side [21].
(ii) It minimizes the risk of introducing security vulner-
abilities due to any possible change in the m-coupon
format (e.g., addition of further fields during solution
development or maintenance).
(iii) It minimizes the risk of introducing security vul-
nerabilities in the communication protocol (which is
extremely simple: one single piece of information, one
single round, or one single check).
(iv) It increases the perceived security and robustness
of the solution by stores: even if they cannot enter
into the technical details, the mere fact that a mobile
coupon is “cryptographically signed” is certainly very
important in this respect.
Furthermore, usage of cryptographically signed QR codes
minimizes the amount of data to be transmitted over the
HTTPS channel. Using the same data size as in the previous
analysis (D-code 20 characters, D-expire 6 characters, andD-
text 230 characters), one has the following:
(i) Proposed solution: a request is a D-code and an
operation description; a response is an operation
outcome; there are approximately 20 characters in
total.
(ii) Solution without cryptographic signature: a request
would be identical, while a response would contain
also D-expire andD-text; there are approximately 230
characters in total.
Saving 200 characters for each request may be important
because all service interactions occur over HTTPS; that is,
they are encrypted. Throughput in terms of bytes/sec, rather
than in terms of clients serviced, may often be an issue.
Although the actual saving will be amortized by the fixed
cost of HTTP headers, the difference between 20 and 230
characters is not negligible. The amount of data involved in
disk transfers is also minimized in the same way.
3.5. Single Spendability. In order to ensure single spendability,
the proposed approach is based on a centralized-synchronous
architecture: a centralized database inwhich each redemption
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is recorded immediately. Indeed, this is the approach taken
in most existing systems with the crucial observation that, in
those systems, a given m-coupon may be redeemed only at
a specific store, or at any store in a predefined small set of
stores [4–8]. Alternative architectures may be devised which
differ in terms ofwhen andwhere redemptions are stored.We
elaborate on those architectures below.
In a centralized-asynchronous architecture, redemption
would be recorded on the centralized database some time
after completion.This architecture would introduce a tempo-
ral window of vulnerability in which the same authentic and
valid couponmay be redeemed at multiple different stores. In
other words, this design would not strive to prevent frauds: it
would require crossing fingers in the hope that the frauds that
are technically permitted do not occur too often. We reject
this design because of the following:
(1) The issuer would have to take the full risk involved
in multiple coupon redemptions; otherwise, stores
would not accept to be involved in m-coupons.
(2) This risk does not seem to provide any technical
advantage: shrinking the vulnerability window down
to a few minutes would not simplify the centralized
service implementation significantly.
A variety of distributed architectures for the service imple-
mentation are possible. For the purpose of this discussion,
all such implementations may be captured by assuming that
the service consists of a number of service points, abstracting
away the details related to the information stored at each
service point and to the coordination between them.
In a distributed-asynchronous architecture, redemption
would be recorded at some service point and the actual
customer transaction may be complete before all necessary
service points are updated. Such an architecture is similar to
the centralized-asynchronous one, except that the systematic
window of vulnerability may be much larger, due to the
need of updating multiple service points. A distributed-
synchronous architecture would be similar, with the added
inconvenience that customer transactions would take longer
to be complete because all service points have to be updated
before completion.
A design in which each store has a locally available list
of m-coupons already redeemed at other stores would fall
in the distributed-asynchronous category. In this case, stores
would have to be willing to work with information that is
updated in periods of tens of minutes or of a few hours:
the corresponding window of vulnerability would be far too
long. Furthermore, it would be easy for stores to realize
this intrinsic weakness, which would severely and negatively
affect acceptance of the system.
4. Concluding Remarks
We proposed an architecture for an m-coupon system and
analyzed its practical feasibility in detail. M-coupons consist
of a cryptographically signed QR code. The architecture
provides strong security guarantees while at the same time
providing high flexibility, high scalability, and ease of imple-
mentation and deployment.
Consumers are not required to install any software on
their devices and are free to handle m-coupons as any other
electronic image, including the ability to move them across
their devices as well as across devices of their relatives. An
m-coupon may be redeemed by any device of any customer;
and an m-coupon may be redeemed at any store, without
any prior arrangement between the consumer and the store.
The architecture may accommodate tens of thousands of
geographically dispersed stores easily. Stores may validate
m-coupons with a low-end smartphone equipped with a
validation app, which guarantees authenticity, integrity, and
temporal validity locally and single spendability through a
one-wayHTTPS interactionwith a centralized service. Single
spendability is guaranteed without any temporal window
within which m-coupons could be redeemed by colluding
attackers at different stores.
The resulting scenario may enable significant improve-
ments over current m-coupon technology, in terms of accep-
tance of potential customers and of marketing actions that
become feasible.
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